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| Bodo Weber |
Deutsche Welle: Just days before the start of negotiations in Washington, the special prosecutor in The Hague is indicting Hashim Thaci and other former KLA leaders. Why so hasty?
Bodo Weber: If we consider President Thaçi's efforts over the past three years for a final agreement with Serbia - privatizing the Kosovar side's negotiating stance, insisting on putting Kosovo in a dangerous agreement to change territories - and that he made to escape the lawsuit of the Special Court, then it was clear that Thaçi would one day be called by this court. The extraordinary decision of the prosecutors to publish the preliminary indictment, before the court makes a decision, has to do with these actions of the president. The fact that prosecutors chose this day testifies to their fear of any possible bargaining in the negotiations that would take place on Saturday at the White House, regardless of whether this concern was grounded or not.
Does this mean that the Special Prosecutor's Office, contrary to what is speculated in the region, does not allow itself to be influenced by the administration of the United States of America?
Exactly last year, in the context of the resignation of the then Prime Minister Haradinaj, to be questioned by Hague prosecutors, there was much speculation, even among European government circles, about whether the Hague tribunal is influenced by the Trump administration, as Haradinaj was against supporting the agreement on the exchange of territories. The prosecutors' current move, however unusual, confirms the independence of The Hague, as it is contrary to the interests of the Trump administration. This decision is being criticized as "political" by the political elites in Kosovo, but even if this decision is somewhat political, it was forced by the actions of President Thaçi and his supporters inside and outside Kosovo, and there is no evidence that this Court is political. Despite the indecision of Western policy on the issue of war crimes processing in the region, the product of which is the establishment of the Special Court.
Another speculation circulating in the region is the fear that after this hasty step lies a plan to speed up the trial of Thaçi and his leaders, in order to get the Court cleared as a figure.
I don't see it that way. First of all, it is the activities of the Trump administration, and its envoy, Grenell, who are being harmed by this publicity. Since Washington has relied more on President Thaçi than the EU, it seems to me that the American side in the transatlantic competition for dialogue is more harmed than the EU.