In the Republic of Albania, the familiar narrative is one of the ruling coalition (the so-called “position”) versus the parliamentary minority (the “opposition”). Yet, revelations now emerging from within the ranks of the opposition cast a harsh light on the true nature of that binary. Former MP Myslim Murrizi has publicly exposed the assets and business interests of a number of deputies from the opposition bloc (especially the Democratic Party of Albania, PD) who have held that status for more than 13 years — suggesting that the much-touted “opposition” may in fact be deeply enmeshed in the same extractive practices as those in power.
This article examines how key deals between “position” and “opposition” parties in Albania challenge democratic norms and how the revelations about opposition deputies’ wealth raise the question: are “position” and “opposition” merely two sides of the same coin when it comes to the public purse?
What the facts show: deals and democratic backsliding
A number of credible sources document that the major parties in Albania — the ruling Socialist Party of Albania (PS) and the Democratic Party (PD) — have engaged in agreements that weaken democratic accountability and bolster their dominance. Among them:
• In July 2024, PS and PD reached an electoral reform deal – retrospectively opening only one-third of candidate lists to preferential voting, leaving the major share of seats still controlled by the party leadership.
• In the 2024 - 2025 period, observers rated Albania as a “Transitional or Hybrid Regime” with a democracy score of only 3.79 out of 7, pointing to the dominance of institutions by ruling forces, weak oversight by the opposition, and limited media freedom.
• Analysts note that the opposition has been deeply fragmented, making the Duopoly of PS-PD entrenched and reducing the chances of real alternative parties gaining traction.
• One paper observes that both major parties use campaign messaging that emphasises image over policy, and that the structure of politics in Albania remains heavily shaped by the old establishment.
These examples suggest that both “position” and “opposition” can cooperate — formally or tacitly — to maintain political control. The 2024 electoral reform deal in particular illustrates how the PD, while nominally in opposition, accepted a formula that preserves strong party-leadership control: in effect reducing meaningful voter choice.
The revelation: opposition deputies’ wealth and the lore of “rare opposition”
Into this dynamic steps Myslim Murrizi, who points out that some deputies of the PD (long labelled as opposition) have substantial business interests and assets. Among those mentioned:
• Flamur Noka – Murrizi cites a moment in the PD parliamentary group meeting when Noka instructed deputies to wear 5,000-euro suits and focus on the external appearance of “opposition”, while behind the scenes cooperating for codified electoral deals.
• Oerd Bylykbashi – Mentioned as having a seaside villa and linked to business interests.
• Isuf Çela, Luçiano Boçi, Besart Xhaferri, Eno Bozo – All named as having profitable businesses, family wealth or property exceeding half-a-million euros.
Murrizi’s core argument: the “opposition” in Albania is not a force standing against corruption or misuse of power — it is part and parcel of the system. The clothing may change, but the inner logic remains: access to government contracts, business interests, collusion with power. In his words: “It’s not the suit or tie that matters, but dignity, honesty, courage… the problem is when the opposition sells itself to power for the chair.”
Why this suggests that Position = Opposition in practice
• Shared deals: When both PS and PD agree to electoral-rules reforms that preserve party-leadership control rather than open lists and true competition, this is less democratic contestation and more elite self-preservation.
• Entrenched business interests: Opposition deputies being discussed openly as business-owners, property-holders and million-euro asset-holders suggests the opposition is also part of the politico-economic elite, not a challenger to it.
• Lack of oversight: Sources document that the opposition’s internal divisions and weak institutional role mean it fails effectively to hold power to account.
• Legacy of communism: Murrizi himself invokes the “rotten communist mindset” of the major parties, noting that the main parties since the fall of the communist system have largely been the heirs of the former single-party system — and thus the real political choice for citizens remains extremely narrow.
Interpretation & implications
What emerges is a troubling portrait: a political system in which the labels of “government” and “opposition” still exist, but the underlying economic and power structures remain largely unchanged. The “opposition” is not always what it appears to be; it can be a partner in preserving the system, rather than a force of change.
For citizens, this means:
• Political accountability is weakened when both major sides cooperate in elite deals.
• Business-politics collusion becomes the norm, not the exception, when deputies from the “opposition” have substantial business interests.
• Genuine reform, democratization and new political alternatives are harder to organise when the duopoly guards its power through structural reforms (e.g., electoral laws) and co-optation.
What needs to happen
• Transparency of deputies’ assets and business interests must be strengthened: citizens deserve to know whether their representatives have conflicts, business holdings, or benefit from state contracts.
• Electoral reforms must move beyond cosmetic compromises (e.g., partial preferential voting) to genuine voter choice, open lists and reduction of party-leadership dominance.
• Support for new political actors and civil society is essential: when the major parties are entrenched elites, real change often comes from outside those circles.
• Independent oversight mechanisms (including anti-corruption bodies, media and civil society) must be empowered, not weakened by elite deals.
The allegations raised by Murrizi, when combined with documented reforms and structural weaknesses, present a compelling indictment: in Albania, the façade of opposition persists, but the substance of power sharing remains limited. The two main parties appear unified in practice when it comes to preserving elite advantage — dressed differently, but playing the same game.
If Albania is to progress toward genuine democracy, the distinction between position and opposition must mean something real — not just on paper, but in practice. Citizens must see that opposition means challenge, not collusion; that deputies represent the public, not their businesses; that major reforms are not negotiated behind closed doors but debated openly and won by voters.
Until then, the spectacle of opposition may simply be a costume — no matter how expensive the suit.