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The unrest in Tirana has become impossible to dismiss as an ordinary political confrontation. On October 14, international media reported that fires had engulfed the Ministry of Education and two bank branches during student demonstrations. Days later, further clashes spread across the capital, with reports of damage to a court building and other public and private property. Euronews also reported injuries among protesters and police as the confrontation intensified.
These events are a warning that Albania's political crisis is no longer confined to Parliament, television studios or party headquarters. It has spilled into the streets, where an increasingly frustrated generation is demanding a future that its political leaders have failed to guarantee.
But amid the smoke, anger and destruction, one question remains conspicuously absent from much of the political debate: What institutional solution can prevent Albania from returning to the same crisis after Edi Rama leaves office?
That is the question Albania's political class must answer.
The failure of Albania's political elite
The responsibility for finding a way out of this crisis cannot rest solely on the shoulders of students, ordinary protesters or citizens who have lost faith in their institutions.
It also belongs to politicians, journalists, university professors, intellectuals, political analysts and public figures who possess the platforms, knowledge and influence to explain the choices facing the country.
Where are the detailed proposals? Where is the serious national debate about an electoral system that gives citizens meaningful control over who represents them? Where are the independent voices willing to explain what must happen the day after the prime minister resigns?
For too long, Albania's political debate has revolved around personalities rather than institutions. The argument is repeatedly reduced to whether Edi Rama should remain in power or whether Sali Berisha and the opposition should replace him.
This is an impoverished vision of political change.
Rama's departure, if it occurs, would not automatically produce independent institutions, accountable representatives, cleaner elections or a political culture based on public service. A change of government without a change in the rules could simply transfer power from one established political network to another.
The country does not need another promise that a different leader will solve everything. It needs safeguards that make it harder for any leader to capture the state in the first place.
The failure of Albania's elites is not merely that they disagree about the future. It is that too few of them are willing to put forward a credible, detailed and enforceable plan for getting there.
The violence is real. So is the crisis behind it.
Violence against public institutions and private businesses must not be romanticised as a necessary instrument of political change.
Burning a court, setting fire to a bank or destroying a shop does not create justice. It damages institutions, livelihoods and public confidence, while providing the authorities with an opportunity to shift attention away from the grievances that brought people into the streets.
Students have legitimate reasons to demand better educational conditions, affordable higher education, fair opportunities and accountability. International reporting has documented the combination of these grievances with wider anger over corruption and the government's refusal to bow to demands for Rama's resignation.
But the legitimacy of a political demand does not make every action undertaken in its name legitimate.
At the same time, it would be equally irresponsible to use images of burning buildings to dismiss the entire protest movement as criminal or to suggest that every participant is responsible for the violence.
There have also been allegations and competing claims about people allegedly paid to provoke destruction, including claims that some actors may be connected to political parties or government interests. Some business owners have reportedly questioned who was responsible for the damage to their property. Allegations have also circulated about plainclothes police officers or other unidentified individuals within protest crowds.
These claims require independent investigation, verifiable evidence and transparent findings. Their existence does not establish who organised any particular act of destruction.
The authorities must investigate impartially, preserve video evidence, identify individual offenders and protect peaceful demonstrators. If evidence shows that political actors deliberately organised violence, they must be held accountable regardless of party affiliation.
The same principle applies to the police. Public order cannot become a licence for unnecessary force, arbitrary treatment or intimidation of peaceful citizens.
A state that demands respect for the law must demonstrate that its own conduct is governed by the law.
Rama's resignation is not a political programme
Edi Rama has become the central target of the protests, and demonstrators have repeatedly demanded his resignation. But an opposition movement cannot build a democratic transition on a single demand and leave the country's future undefined.
What happens the morning after Rama resigns?
Who governs? Under what mandate? For how long? Who guarantees that public resources will not be used to benefit one party? Who reforms the electoral system? Who ensures that the next election is genuinely competitive?
These are not technical details to be postponed until after a political victory. They are the very questions that determine whether such a victory would mean anything.
Political statements calling for Rama's departure are insufficient if they do not explain what comes next. Politicians from both sides must be judged by their concrete proposals, not by the intensity of their rhetoric.
Albania's political class has spent decades fighting over government offices, electoral advantages and economic influence. Citizens have every reason to demand proof that the next transition will not simply reproduce the same arrangements under a different name.
It is reasonable to question the independence of political declarations when their authors offer no institutional guarantees. It would be wrong, however, to assume that every politician, journalist or academic who remains silent has been bought. What can be demanded of all of them is evidence, transparency, intellectual independence and a willingness to defend proposals that may challenge their own political interests.
The country needs a roadmap, not another personality cult.
The electoral system is the question Albania cannot avoid
At the centre of this crisis lies a fundamental democratic problem: how can citizens exercise meaningful control over the people elected to represent them?
On April 21, 2008, Albania amended its Constitution, replacing the previous mixed electoral arrangement with a proportional system based on regional constituencies. The reform was backed by an agreement between the country's two major political parties, the Socialist Party led by Edi Rama and the Democratic Party led by Sali Berisha.
The Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly documented the constitutional changes and the broad consensus between the two major parties in its report on Albania's 2009 parliamentary elections.
The significance of that political agreement should not be underestimated. Electoral rules are not neutral technical arrangements. They shape who can enter Parliament, how parties select candidates and how much influence voters exercise over individual representatives.
Albania's current electoral framework has evolved since 2008, including through subsequent legal and constitutional amendments. Nevertheless, the fundamental question remains: does the system adequately empower voters, or does it give party leaderships excessive control over political representation?
The OSCE's final report on Albania's May 11, 2025 parliamentary elections identified a highly polarised environment, an uneven playing field, reported intimidation, misuse of public resources, pressure on public employees, instances of vote-buying and problems with ballot secrecy. It also called for comprehensive electoral reform and greater independence in election administration.
These findings do not mean that every election result is illegitimate or that every elected representative lacks a genuine mandate. They do, however, provide a credible institutional basis for demanding deeper reform.
The central issue is not simply whether Albanians vote. It is whether their votes translate into meaningful choices and whether elected representatives remain accountable to those who elected them.
An electoral system that gives party leaders excessive influence over candidate selection risks turning representatives,cleaner elections or a political culture based on public service. A change of government without a change in the rules could simply transfer power from one established political network to another.
The country does not need another promise that a different leader will solve everything. It needs safeguards that make it harder for any leader to capture the state in the first place.
The failure of Albania's elites is not merely that they disagree about the future. It is that too few of them are willing to put forward a credible, detailed and enforceable plan for getting there.
The violence is real. So is the crisis behind it.
Violence against public institutions and private businesses must not be romanticised as a necessary instrument of political change.
Burning a court, setting fire to a bank or destroying a shop does not create justice. It damages institutions, livelihoods and public confidence, while providing the authorities with an opportunity to shift attention away from the grievances that brought people into the streets.
Students have legitimate reasons to demand better educational conditions, affordable higher education, fair opportunities and accountability. International reporting has documented the combination of these grievances with wider anger over corruption and the government's refusal to bow to demands for Rama's resignation.
But the legitimacy of a political demand does not make every action undertaken in its name legitimate.
At the same time, it would be equally irresponsible to use images of burning buildings to dismiss the entire protest movement as criminal or to suggest that every participant is responsible for the violence.
There have also been allegations and competing claims about people allegedly paid to provoke destruction, including claims that some actors may be connected to political parties or government interests. Some business owners have reportedly questioned who was responsible for the damage to their property. Allegations have also circulated about plainclothes police officers or other unidentified individuals within protest crowds.
These claims require independent investigation, verifiable evidence and transparent findings. Their existence does not establish who organised any particular act of destruction.
The authorities must investigate impartially, preserve video evidence, identify individual offenders and protect peaceful demonstrators. If evidence shows that political actors deliberately organised violence, they must be held accountable regardless of party affiliation.
The same principle applies to the police. Public order cannot become a licence for unnecessary force, arbitrary treatment or intimidation of peaceful citizens.
A state that demands respect for the law must demonstrate that its own conduct is governed by the law.
Rama's resignation is not a political programme
Edi Rama has become the central target of the protests, and demonstrators have repeatedly demanded his resignation. But an opposition movement cannot build a democratic transition on a single demand and leave the country's future undefined.
What happens the morning after Rama resigns?
Who governs? Under what mandate? For how long? Who guarantees that public resources will not be used to benefit one party? Who reforms the electoral system? Who ensures that the next election is genuinely competitive?
These are not technical details to be postponed until after a political victory. They are the very questions that determine whether such a victory would mean anything.
Political statements calling for Rama's departure are insufficient if they do not explain what comes next. Politicians from both sides must be judged by their concrete proposals, not by the intensity of their rhetoric.
Albania's political class has spent decades fighting over government offices, electoral advantages and economic influence. Citizens have every reason to demand proof that the next transition will not simply reproduce the same arrangements under a different name.
It is reasonable to question the independence of political declarations when their authors offer no institutional guarantees. It would be wrong, however, to assume that every politician, journalist or academic who remains silent has been bought. What can be demanded of all of them is evidence, transparency, intellectual independence and a willingness to defend proposals that may challenge their own political interests.
The country needs a roadmap, not another personality cult.
The electoral system is the question Albania cannot avoid
At the centre of this crisis lies a fundamental democratic problem: how can citizens exercise meaningful control over the people elected to represent them?
On April 21, 2008, Albania amended its Constitution, replacing the previous mixed electoral arrangement with a proportional system based on regional constituencies. The reform was backed by an agreement between the country's two major political parties, the Socialist Party led by Edi Rama and the Democratic Party led by Sali Berisha.
The Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly documented the constitutional changes and the broad consensus between the two major parties in its report on Albania's 2009 parliamentary elections.
The significance of that political agreement should not be underestimated. Electoral rules are not neutral technical arrangements. They shape who can enter Parliament, how parties select candidates and how much influence voters exercise over individual representatives.
Albania's current electoral framework has evolved since 2008, including through subsequent legal and constitutional amendments. Nevertheless, the fundamental question remains: does the system adequately empower voters, or does it give party leaderships excessive control over political representation?
The OSCE's final report on Albania's May 11, 2025 parliamentary elections identified a highly polarised environment, an uneven playing field, reported intimidation, misuse of public resources, pressure on public employees, instances of vote-buying and problems with ballot secrecy. It also called for comprehensive electoral reform and greater independence in election administration.
These findings do not mean that every election result is illegitimate or that every elected representative lacks a genuine mandate. They do, however, provide a credible institutional basis for demanding deeper reform.
The central issue is not simply whether Albanians vote. It is whether their votes translate into meaningful choices and whether elected representatives remain accountable to those who elected them.
An electoral system that gives party leaders excessive influence over candidate selection risks turning representatives into political dependants rather than independent voices for their constituents.
That is why electoral reform must become the centre of the national debate, rather than a subject reserved for negotiations between party leaders.
Two serious alternatives: majoritarian elections or fully open proportional lists
Albania should urgently debate two possible models of reform.
The first is a majoritarian electoral system, under which representatives are elected directly in constituencies. Such a model could strengthen the connection between an MP and the voters in a particular area, making it easier for citizens to identify and hold their representative accountable.
But majoritarian elections are not a universal cure. Depending on their design, they can exclude smaller parties, distort the relationship between votes and seats, and allow a party with concentrated support to win disproportionate power. Constituency boundaries, electoral thresholds and safeguards against manipulation would therefore require careful consideration.
The second is a proportional system with 100% open lists, under which voters would have meaningful freedom to determine which individual candidates are elected, rather than having a substantial share of representatives effectively protected by party-controlled list positions.
A genuinely open-list system could reduce party leaders' control over parliamentary careers and encourage candidates to compete for public trust instead of depending primarily on internal party hierarchies.
However, merely labelling a system “open list” is not enough. The rules must ensure that voter preferences genuinely determine the order of elected candidates, with transparent counting and no closed-list mechanism that overrides voters' choices.
Neither model should be imposed simply because one political camp believes it would benefit from it. The choice must follow a transparent national debate, independent expert analysis and meaningful public consultation.
The objective should be clear: citizens must have greater power over who represents them, while the system must preserve fair representation, political pluralism and equal voting rights.
Albania should not exchange one form of political concentration for another.
A caretaker government must come with a binding mandate
The immediate political priority should be the creation of a credible, temporary caretaker or technical government through a constitutional and legally agreed process.
Such a government should not be a backdoor arrangement through which the opposition takes office without an election. Nor should it be a mechanism for dividing ministries, public companies and economic influence between rival political factions.
Its legitimacy must come from a narrowly defined public mandate, transparent appointments, parliamentary accountability and a clear timetable.
That mandate should include:
- Urgent electoral reform: prepare and adopt changes to the Electoral Code through an inclusive process, with independent expertise and public scrutiny.
- A fair electoral administration: strengthen the independence and impartiality of election commissions and ensure transparent campaign financing.
- Protection of public resources: prevent the use of state institutions, public employees and government resources for partisan advantage.
- Independent oversight: ensure that allegations of corruption, electoral manipulation, political violence and police misconduct are investigated without political interference.
- A defined transition: establish a realistic timetable for the next election under reformed rules, with adequate preparation and credible monitoring.
The caretaker government must not have an unlimited mandate. Its duration, powers, reporting obligations and limits should be written into a public agreement and, where required, the relevant legal framework.
Its members should not use the transition to campaign from positions of state authority. Their task should be to prepare the conditions for a genuinely competitive election, not to determine its outcome.
The transition must also protect the continuity of public services, the independence of the judiciary and Albania's international obligations. A political crisis cannot become an excuse to weaken the state further.
The crucial principle is simple: the caretaker government must prepare the conditions for a democratic choice; it must not choose the next rulers itself.
Journalists, academics and intellectuals must do more than describe the crisis
Albania's media and intellectual establishment now faces a test of professional integrity.
Journalists are not required to endorse a particular electoral model. Professors are not obliged to support a particular government. Analysts should not be expected to speak with one voice.
But independent journalism and serious intellectual work require more than broadcasting accusations, repeating party statements or presenting political manoeuvres as inevitable.
The public deserves answers to specific questions. Which electoral system would give voters greater control? How would the reform protect smaller parties? How could campaign finance be monitored? What constitutional steps would be required to establish a caretaker government? How would the transition prevent the same political elites from controlling the process?
These are questions that experienced journalists, constitutional lawyers, political scientists and university professors should be debating openly.
Silence is not proof of corruption, and disagreement is not proof of complicity. Yet professional independence must be demonstrated through evidence, scrutiny and the courage to challenge powerful interests on every side.
An intellectual elite that can diagnose a crisis but refuses to discuss workable solutions is failing its public responsibility.
The same applies to opposition figures who demand change but avoid explaining how they would surrender the advantages of the existing system.
The opposition must prove that it wants a different system
The opposition cannot credibly demand a new political beginning while treating the electoral rules as negotiable only when they threaten its own interests.
Sali Berisha and the Democratic Party, like Edi Rama and the Socialist Party, must answer a basic question: would they accept reforms that reduce the control of party leaderships over candidate selection, even if those reforms weakened their own immediate political advantage?
A commitment to fully open lists or a majoritarian system must be demonstrated through specific legislative proposals, not campaign slogans.
The same test applies to smaller parties and independent political figures. They must explain not only what is wrong with the current arrangements, but what rules they would establish and how they would prevent the next governing majority from abusing its power.
A credible transition requires more than the resignation of one prime minister. It requires political actors to accept rules that they cannot simply rewrite for their own benefit whenever they win office.
If the political class refuses to make that commitment, citizens have reason to suspect that the struggle is about who controls the system, rather than whether the system should change.
Europe cannot be a slogan used to postpone democratic reform
Albania's European integration aspirations make this crisis even more consequential.
European institutions and international partners should look beyond the immediate question of whether the protests remain peaceful or whether the government survives. They should also examine the institutional conditions that have contributed to the loss of public trust.
The OSCE's findings on the 2025 elections provide a concrete starting point for that discussion. Its recommendations concerning electoral administration, public resources, campaign financing and media independence should be treated as a reform agenda, not as a report to be cited and then forgotten.
European integration requires functioning democratic institutions, accountable government, credible elections and respect for fundamental rights. It cannot be reduced to diplomatic ceremonies, economic agreements or declarations of progress.
International partners should encourage dialogue between the government, opposition, civil society, students and independent experts. They should also insist that allegations of violence and misconduct be investigated impartially.
But the ultimate responsibility belongs to Albanians themselves. No international institution can build a democratic political culture on behalf of a country whose own political class refuses to change the rules.
Albania needs a democratic reset, not another political bargain
The burning of public buildings and banks should alarm every Albanian, regardless of political affiliation. So should the prospect of a government that refuses to address legitimate public grievances, an opposition that offers no credible transition plan, and institutions that citizens increasingly regard as distant from their interests.
The answer is neither to glorify violence nor to pretend that the existing political arrangement can continue indefinitely without consequences.
It is to recognise that the country needs an institutional reset.
A caretaker government, established through a lawful and transparent process, should have one overriding mission: to create the conditions for a fair election under reformed electoral rules.
The national debate must now focus on the two serious alternatives: a carefully designed majoritarian system or proportional representation with genuinely 100% open lists. Independent experts should explain the advantages, risks and constitutional requirements of each model. Political parties should publish their positions. Civil society and students should be able to scrutinise the proposals.
The process must be public, time-limited and protected against manipulation by either of the two major parties.
Most importantly, reform must be completed before the next election, not postponed until after the political winners have taken office.
Albania cannot afford another cycle in which citizens mobilise, politicians negotiate, a new arrangement is announced and the underlying problem remains untouched.
The generation protesting in Tirana deserves more than promises. It deserves a system in which a vote is not merely an act of participation, but a meaningful instrument of accountability.
Edi Rama's resignation, by itself, would not solve Albania's crisis. The replacement of one political leader by another would not guarantee democracy. The real test is whether Albania can finally establish electoral rules that give citizens greater power than party leaders.
That is the question the political class must answer now.
And it is the question the country can no longer afford to avoid.
Oculus News Editorial Staff